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JUDICIAL BALANCING OF USES FOR PUBLIC 
PROPERTY: THE PARAMOUNT PUBLIC USE 
DOCTRINE 
Joris Naiman· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If a public entity seeks to take property that is owned not privately 
but by another public entity, how should a court decide which entity 
prevails? Paramount public use is a doctrine addressing takings 
between two entities that both hold eminent domain. 1 The doctrine 
prescribes a somewhat unusual judicial role to meet this equally 
unusual situation. 2 Pursuant to this doctrine, a court balances com-
peting uses for particular public property,3 making a policy deter-
mination of which use of the property better serves the public ne-
cessity.4 Despite placing a court in a seemingly unorthodox, policy-
making role, the paramount public use doctrine enables rational 
choice of public property uses.5 
• Articles Editor, 1989-90, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 The doctrine addresses only those public property use conflicts that are not determined 
by statute. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
2 Proceedings between two holders of eminent domain are only unusual in the sense that 
they are less common than takings of private property. Conflicts between holders of eminent 
domain arise regularly, because of the number of such potential parties and the scope of their 
activities. See Comment, Balancing Public Purposes: A Neglected Problem in Condemnation, 
35 ALB. L. REV. 769, 769-70 n.3 (1971) (there are over 400 different condemnors in the State 
of New York). 
3 See, e.g., infra notes 109-24 and accompanying text. See generally Ball, Intergovernmental 
Coriflicts in Land Acquisition: Adjustment for Maximum Public Benefit, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 
30, 34-85 (1949). 
4 The scope of the court's policy determination is limited to conform with the role of the 
courts in government. See infra text accompanying note 197; see also lA J. SACKMAN, 
NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.11[4] (rev. 3d ed. 1985) (legislature may give 
courts the duty of determining necessity of takings) [hereinafter NICHOLS]. 
5 See infra text accompanying note 192. 
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Judicial review in most eminent domain proceedings is limited. 6 A 
court will not entertain arguments that a taking, or "condemnation," 
of private property is unnecessary or will create little public benefit. 7 
Courts consider the necessity for a taking to be an issue of policy 
for the legislature, rather than an issue of law. 8 
Both a legislature and a "general condemnor" entity granted em-
inent domain by statute may take private property without judicial 
review of the necessity for the taking.9 The distinction between a 
legislature and a general condemnor becomes important to judicial 
review when public property is condemned. 10 A court will not review 
the necessity of a taking of public property by a legislature. 11 Courts 
regard the necessity of changing public uses, like the necessity of 
taking private property, as a policy question for legislative deter-
mination. 12 If property is sought to be taken by a general condemnor, 
however, and if the condemnee entity also has the powers of a 
general condemnor, then a court may have difficulty divining legis-
lative intent. 13 A court may be forced into an independent review of 
policy to resolve the conflict between two general condemnors. 14 
Rather than adopt a mechanical rule that defers to either the 
general condemnor acting in the role of a condemnee or the general 
condemnor acting as condemnor, a court may perform a judicial 
balancing of public uses. 15 The balancing test considers facts pre-
sented by both parties. 16 Each party's need for the contested prop-
erty, and the public utility of each party's use, are weighed. 17 In the 
resulting adversarial proceeding, a court's deference to the condem-
6 1A NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 4.11[1], at 4-198. 
71d. 
SId. at 4-198 to 4-199. 
9 See, e.g., 11 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.20 (3d ed. 1983) 
(municipality may take for "every necessary purpose" under general power to condemn). 
10 See id. § 32.67 ("general authority" is insufficient to enable taking of property already 
devoted to public use); 1 NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 2.2, at 2-58 ("general delegation" of 
authority is insufficient to take public property). 
11 1 NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 2.2. "[T]he character of the 'res' as public property, generally, 
has no inhibiting influence upon the [sovereign's] exercise of [eminent domain]." Id. at 2-55. 
12 See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946). "The comparative desirability and 
necessity for the [condemned] site [are] matters for legislative or administrative determination 
rather than for a judicial finding." Id. at 247. 
13 Cf. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 2.2[3] (conflict between policies of preserving prior use 
and enabling more necessary public use compounded by judicial disinclination to intrude upon 
legislative policy-making function). 
14 See Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 580,120 A.2d 593, 5in (1956). 
16 See Ball, supra note 3, at 33-35. 
16 See id. at 36-37. 
17 See Weehawken, 20 N.J. at 580, 120 A.2d at 597 (quoting 2 J. LEWIS, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 440 (3d ed. 1909)). 
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nor's quasi-legislative determination of necessity is balanced by equal 
deference to the condemnee. 18 The result is judicial review of the 
necessity for a taking. 19 
Judicial balancing of uses results in a determination of the "para-
mount public use."20 To avoid the appearance of making policy, a 
court may refer to its balance as a search for legislative intent, 
implied in fact.21 If a court balances facts presented by both parties, 
however, it is effectively making a policy choice.22 The justification 
for this judicial review is that it enables a court to resolve conflicts 
between general condemnors on a rational basis. 23 
This Comment focuses exclusively upon state law. Section II pro-
vides examples of cases in which courts have determined the para-
mount public use and an example of a statute that incorporates 
judicial balancing of uses. Section III of this Comment presents 
paradigms for judicial review in eminent domain proceedings be-
tween general condemnors acting in the roles of condemnor and 
condemnee, and discusses factors that support judicial balancing of 
uses. Section IV concludes by recommending that courts adopt the 
paramount public use doctrine. 
II. EMINENT DOMAIN LAW AND THE STATUS OF PARAMOUNT 
PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE 
A. Eminent Domain: The Powers of General Condemnors 
Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property 
for public use. 24 The common law vests sovereign powers exclusively 
18 See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
19 Cf supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
20 This tenninology has not received uniform application. See Bergen County Sewer Auth. 
v. Borough of Little Ferry, 7 N.J. Super. 213, 218-19, 72 A.2d 886, 889 (App. Div. 1950); cf 
El Paso County v. City of El Paso, 357 S. W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); see also infra 
notes 50-58 and accompanying text. 
21 See Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 343, 348, 225 N.W. 164, 166 (1929) 
("implied authority . . . considered" by court, under criterion that it be "evident that the 
[condemnor] cannot ... reasonably carry on its business" without the taking); cf Weehawken, 
20 N.J. at 580, 120 A.2d at 597 ("Whatever may be the range of factual circumstances upon 
which [condemnor's] power may be 'necessarily implied' ... [balancing of uses] becomes a 
subject of judicial indulgence to a greater or less[ er] degree.") (emphasis added). But see infra 
note 47. 
22 A court's resolution of a conflict between uses results in "policy" formulation to the extent 
that the court's decision is not solely dictated by the language of the parties' grants of eminent 
domain. 
23 A court's decision is rational in the sense that it is based upon the greater public benefit, 
rather than upon an arbitrary rule. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
24 1 NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 1.11, at 1-7. 
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in the federal and state legislatures. 25 A legislature's eminent domain 
is restricted only by constitutional limitations.26 A state legislature 
may condemn property directly by special legislation.27 Alterna-
tively, a legislature may grant eminent domain to lesser entities. 28 
These entities include state agencies, public corporations such as 
counties and municipalities, and privately owned, public service cor-
porations, such as utilities. 29 Both constitutional limits and the terms 
of the grant restrict the eminent domain of lesser entities. 30 
Legislatures empower some state agencies to take property on 
the legislature's behalf and to exercise full eminent domain for a 
specific, statutory purpose. 31 A general condemnor, in contrast, has 
limited eminent domain under a general statutory grant of author-
ity.32 A general condemnor may take private property for its own 
use, to support its public duties,33 but is limited in its ability to take 
public property. 34 
Historically, the "prior public use" rule has prevented general 
condemnors from taking public property.35 This common-law rule 
25 26 AM. JUR. 20 Eminent DOrrULin § 5 (1966). This Comment considers only the exercise 
of eminent domain within state government. The principles of paramount public use doctrine 
should be equally applicable at the federal level. But see Ball, supra note 3, at 37, 40-43 
(treating federal government as a single, coherent entity, governed by a clear hierarchy of 
agency authorities). 
26 See 26 AM. JUR. 20 Eminent Domain §§ 5, 7 (1966). 
'Z1 See id. § 5. 
28 [d. 
29 See, e.g., 11 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, § 32.12, at 260; 1 NICHOLS, supra note 4, 
§ 1.141[4], at 1-41. 
30 See 26 AM. JUR. 20 Eminent DOrrULin §§ 7, 10, 19 (1966). 
31 See Hiland v. Ives, 154 Conn. 683, 686-88, 228 A.2d 502, 504 (1967); cf. United States v. 
Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 n.13 (1946). 
32 Eminent domain may be granted to a public corporation without express language, as an 
incident of the corporation's governmental power. See 1 NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 1.14[4], at 
1-33. Eminent domain may be granted to a public service corporation either by express 
language of the corporate charter or by general act empowering all corporations serving a 
particular public need. See 26 AM. JUR. 20 Eminent DOrrULin § 20 (1966). The general grant 
of authority enables a condemnor to take private property. Takings of property already in 
public use are discussed at infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. See generally United 
States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 n.13 (1946) (comparing legislature's power to take for 
any public purpose with public service corporation's power to take, for its own use, only that 
property expressly identified or necessarily implied in grant of eminent domain). 
33 This power, however, does not permit a general condemnor to take for a solely private 
purpose. City of Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 428, 107 P. 199, 201-02 (1910). 
34 1 NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 2.2; 11 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 9, § 32.67, at 402-03. 
35 Florida E. Coast Ry. v. City of Miami, 321 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1975); see City of New 
Haven v. Town of East Haven, 35 Conn. SUpp. 157, 164-65,402 A.2d 345,349-50 (Super. Ct. 
1977); Vermont Hydro-Elec. Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 149, 112 A. 223, 225 (1921). Purposes 
of the prior public use rule are to prevent "the most absurd result[]" of multiple takings and 
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permits a general condemnor to take public property only by specific 
legislative direction. 36 The legislative intent may be in express lan-
guage of a statute, or be "necessarily implied" by statutory lan-
guage. 37 Under the prior public use rule, a suit to condemn public 
property thus involves an exercise in statutory interpretation.38 Sta-
tutory interpretation is a traditional function of the judiciary. 39 
Some courts have argued that the search for legislative intent can 
proceed beyond the statutory language that enables a condemnor to 
exercise eminent domain.40 These courts would find legislative intent 
necessarily implied in facts supporting a condemnor's need for spe-
cific property.41 The facts must arise from circumstances beyond a 
condemnor's control, and must prevent the condemnor from per-
forming its public duties unless it takes the property.42 Necessarily-
re-takings of the same property, Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande 
R. R., 30 Colo. 204, 212-13, 69 P. 568, 571 (1902); and to avoid the impropriety of the state's 
nullifying its own prior dedication of property to public use, without specific consideration of 
the superseding public use. Board of Educ. v. Pace College, 27 A.D.2d 87,89-90,276 N. Y.S.2d 
162, 165 (1966). 
36 A legislature may grant either power to take public property generally, or power to take 
the specific property contested. See 1 NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 2.2, at 2-58. There are also 
exceptions to the prior public use rule that permit taking an easement for a "consistent public 
use," that is, one that will not destroy the prior use, id. § 2.2[8], at 2-95 to 2-98; and that 
permit taking a portion of public property that is not in actual public use. Bergen County 
Sewer Auth. v. Borough of Little Ferry, 7 N.J. Super. 213, 220, 72 A.2d 886,889 (App. Div. 
1950) (no basis to deny taking of municipally owned property that is unoccupied); see Florida 
E. Coast Ry., 321 So. 2d at 548-49 (property serving a function that is "utilitarian in fur-
therance of the public use" for which a condemnee is authorized to exercise eminent domain 
may not be taken by another general condemnor); Vermont Hydro-Elec. Corp. v. Dunn, 95 
Vt. 144, 150, 112 A. 223, 226 (1921) (property held in reasonable expectation of future needs 
is in bona fide public use). 
37 1 NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 2.2, at 2-57 to 2-58. 
38 City of New Haven v. Town of East Haven, 35 Conn. SUpp. 157, 164-65, 402 A.2d 345, 
349-50 (Super. Ct. 1977). 
39 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 142 (1974). 
40 See, e.g., Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Houma, 229 So. 2d 202,207 (La. Ct. 
App. 1969) (authority implied in fact only if clearly inferred from nature of the condemnor's 
use, if condemnor's charter will be defeated without it, and if necessity arises from condemnor's 
basic function, over which condemnor has no control). There is authority that grants of eminent 
domain should be strictly construed against a condemnor. [d.; 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent 
Domain § 18 (1966). This authority is probably directed to takings of private property rights. 
See Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 318, 31 So. 2d 483, 487 (1947). 
It is not clear that there is an analogous policy that would mandate strict statutory construction 
in proceedings to condemn public property. But see City of Torrington v. Coles, 155 Conn. 
199, 201, 230 A.2d 550, 551 (1967) (citing maxim of strict construction without distinguishing 
between private and public property). 
41 Pennsylvania R.R.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. 150, 159 (1880) (finding no such necessity implied in 
fact because the condemnor had an option to condemn other, privately owned property as an 
alternative to taking public property). 
42 [d.; see also Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 30 Colo. 204, 
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implied-in-fact legislative intent is a gloss on the prior public use 
rule. 43 A court employing this gloss performs the somewhat "active" 
judicial function of inferring legislative intent from a condemnor's 
necessity.44 The court need not, however, make an overt policy de-
termination involving general condemnors in the roles of both con-
demnor and condemnee. 45 
B. Status of the Paramount Public Use Doctrine 
Some courts have recognized an exception to the prior public use 
rule, if a general condemnor demonstrates that it has a paramount 
public use. 46 The paramount public use doctrine requires a court to 
balance the needs of two general condemnors for specific property, 
and to determine which use would produce the greater public ben-
efit.47 For example, a city's street department may seek to take 
211, 69 P. 568, 570 (1902); Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Houma, 229 So. 2d 202, 
207 (La. Ct. App. 1969). 
43 A court applying this gloss looks beyond the statutory language of a condemnor's public 
charter to divine legislative "intent" in the facts of the case. Compare City of New Haven v. 
Town of East Haven, 35 Conn. Supp. 157, 164-65, 402 A.2d 345, 349--50 (Super. Ct. 1977) 
(treating legislative intent as a question of law, and regarding the only factual issue to be 
whether condemnee has a valid public use) with supra note 42 (cases seeking condemnor's 
authority from legislative intent implied in fact). 
44 The role is "active" to the extent that a court is required to go beyond its mechanical 
function under the pure prior public use rule. See supra notes 37--39 and accompanying text. 
45 The court does not balance the policies supporting both parties' uses because its focus is 
upon the facts of condemnor's necessity, and condemnee's facts are considered only to establish 
a valid, inconsistent, prior public use. See supra notes 36, 42. 
46 Bergen County Sewer Auth. v. Borough of Little Ferry, 7 N.J. Super. 213, 218-19, 72 
A.2d 886, 889 (App. Div. 1950) (dictum, quoting 2 J. LEWIS, supra note 17, § 440); see also 
Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Houma, 229 So. 2d 202, 211 (La. Ct. App. 1969) 
(dictum in civil law jurisdiction recognizing exception to prior public use rule as a "facet of 
the 'implied necessity doctrine"'); Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 
48 N.J. 261, 273, 225 A.2d 130, 137 (1966) ("comparative evaluation of two public uses ... to 
determine which should prevail as the paramount use" not undertaken because condemnee 
had no eminent domain, and therefore no valid prior public use); Sabine & E. Texas Ry. v. 
Gulf & Interstate Ry., 92 Tex. 162, 166, 168, 46 S. W. 784, 786-87 (1898) (not reaching question 
whether paramount use is to be determined from condemnor's necessity or from balance of 
competing uses, but indicating that "importance to the public" is criterion for decision); 1 
NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 2.2[3]; R. Manwaring, The Paramount Public Use Doctrine 1, 4--5 
(Dec. 2, 1985) (unpublished report No. 236) (file of Professor Zygmunt Plater, Boston College 
Law School). 
47 See Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 580,120 A.2d 593,597 (1956). 
Whatever may be the range of factual circumstances upon which the power [to 
condemn a public use] may be "necessarily implied," it is apparent that a comparative 
evaluation of the proposed and existing users] in terms of public benefit becomes a 
subject of judicial indulgence to a greater or less[er] degree. 
[d. The Weehawken court also quoted language from 2 J. LEWIS, supra note 17, § 440, at 
796, implicating a balancing of the condemnor's and condemnee's uses. See infra note 64. In 
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property already used by the city's school or park commission, 48 
even if the present public user acquired the property by eminent 
domain. Balancing the necessity and benefit of two general condem-
nor's uses is an active judicial function. 49 
Courts have recognized the equivalent of a paramount public use 
exception for at least a century. 50 They have not, however, adopted 
a consistent doctrine or terminology to describe it. 51 In addition to 
"paramount public use,"52 opinions have employed terms including 
"public exigency" and "overwhelming necessities,"53 "reasonable 
public necessity,"54 "public benefit" and "reasonable necessity, "55 
"critical need,"56 "more necessary public use,"57 and "higher use."58 
the original treatise, this balancing was confined to cases where the condemnor's use was 
consistent with the existing use; if the prior public use would be destroyed, then a general 
condemnor was barred from taking. 2 J. LEWIS, supra note 17, § 440, at 796-98. Courts 
quoting from the treatise, however, have ignored the "consistent use" limitation and discussed 
the language as a general test for the paramount public use. See Bergen County, 7 N.J. Super. 
at 218-19,72 A.2d at 889; see also State Highway Comm'n v. City of Elizabeth, 102 N.J. Eq. 
221,224, 140 A. 335, 336 (1928); City of Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 430-
31, 107 P. 199, 202 (1910). 
48 Such takings appear to arise frequently, although they are usually resolved by means 
other than judicial balancing. See, e.g., City of Torrington v. Coles, 155 Conn. 199, 230 A.2d 
550 (1967) (taking of park property); County of Cook v. City of Chicago, 84 Ill. App.2d 301, 
228 N.E.2d 183 (1967) (taking of school); City of Wichita v. Unified School Dist. No. 259, 201 
Kan. 110, 439 P.2d 162 (1968) (taking of school); Town of Brookline v. Metropolitan Dist. 
Comm'n, 357 Mass. 435, 258 N.E.2d 284 (1970) (taking of park property). 
49 A court is "active" in the sense that it weighs arguments advanced by both parties without 
greater deference to either, and reaches an independent decision on the merits without a 
legislative definition of priorities. Compare text accompanying supra notes 39, 44 with infra 
note 181. 
50 See Pennsylvania R.R.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. 150, 159 (1880); Sabine & E. Texas Ry. v. Gulf 
& Interstate Ry., 92 Tex. 162, 166, 168,46 S.W. 784, 786-87 (1898). 
51 The terminology is further confused because some courts have employed "paramount 
public use" in discussing takings of private property. E.g., Treuting v. Bridge and Park 
Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627, 634 (Miss. 1967). If the primary purpose for taking private property 
is to achieve a public benefit, then this purpose is sometimes said to be "paramount," and the 
taking may proceed even if some private benefit results incidentally. [d. The usage described 
is quite separate from the paramount public use doctrine discussed in this Comment. 
52 Bergen County Sewer Auth. v. Borough of Little Ferry, 7 N.J. Super. 213, 218-19, 72 
A.2d 886, 889 (App. Div. 1950); El Paso County v. City of El Paso, 357 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1962). 
53 Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 30 Colo. 204, 210-12, 69 
P. 568, 570-71 (1902). 
54 Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 343, 351, 225 N.W. 164, 167 (1929). 
65 Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 580,120 A.2d 593,597 (1956). 
56 City of Buffalo v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 25, 26, 332 N.Y.S.2d 925, 927 (Sup. 
Ct. 1972). 
57 Woodland School Dist. v. Woodland Cemetery Ass'n, 174 Cal. App. 2d 243, 245-46, 344 
P.2d 326, 327 (1959). 
58 City of Mesa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 92 Ariz. 91, 
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The confusion of terminology has resulted from a tension in the 
judicial balancing role. 59 A court may wish to give equal consideration 
to the public necessities served by both a condemnor and a public 
entity sued as a condemnee.6o Opposing this balancing principle is a 
court's reluctance to intrude upon the legislative policy-making func-
tion. 61 To avoid an overt policy determination, a court may couch its 
opinion in terms of a search for legislative intent implied in fact. 62 
Courts adopting a search for legislative intent have required stan-
dards of "absolute"63 or "reasonable"64 necessity implied in fact to 
support a taking of public property. Nevertheless, a court deciding 
under the rubric of necessity implied in fact may actually be per-
forming a balance of public uses. 65 For example, judicial balancing 
is evident in a court's even-handed treatment of both parties' claims, 
even if the court formally clings to a search for legislative intent. 66 
104, 373 P.2d 722, 731 (1962) (quoting City of Tucson v. Tucson Gas, Elec. Light & Power 
Co., 152 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1945)). 
69 See supra note 47 (court undertaking judicial balancing role while still clinging to putative 
search for implied-in-fact legislative intent). 
60 Equal consideration might help to ensure deciding in favor of the use that best serves 
the public necessity at the contested site, and to guarantee fairness to the public served by 
each use. See generally Payne, Intergovernmental Condemnation as a Problem in Public 
Finance, 61 TEX. L. REV. 949, 972-75 (1983) (drawing analogy between public burdened by 
loss of condemned use, and local citizens burdened by disproportionate taxation). 
61 See State ex rei. Northwestern Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 28 Wash. 2d 476, 486, 183 
P.2d 802, 808 (1947) (court refused to examine condemnor's determination of necessity absent 
fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious action). Judicial reluctance to interfere with a legislative 
function stems from the separation of powers doctrine. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying 
text. 
62 See Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 343, 348-52, 225 N.W. 164, 166-
67 (1929). "[A general condemnor] may be held to have implied authority to condemn [a prior 
public use if condemnor] cannot otherwise reasonably carry on its business and exercise its 
franchise powers." Id. at 348,225 N.W. at 166. 
63 See id.; City of Shakopee v. Clark, 295 N. W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 1980); Pennsylvania R. R.'s 
Appeal, 93 Pa. 150, 159 (1880); cf Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 
195 Ala. 124, 134, 137-38, 71 So. 118, 122-24 (1915) (embracing "actual" necessity standard). 
64 See Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 580, 120 A.2d 593, 597 (1956); 
Bergen County Sewer Auth. v. Borough of Little Ferry, 7 N.J. Super. 213, 218-19, 72 A.2d 
886, 889 (App. Div. 1950). See generally 2 J. LEWIS, supra note 17, § 440, at 796. Lewis 
defines the test for a general condemnor's necessity to take public property in the alternative: 
"there [is] a reasonable necessity for the taking where the public interests would be better 
[]served thereby, or where the advantages to the condemnor will largely exceed the disad-
vantages to the condemnee." Id. Both the terms ''better served" and "largely exceed" appear 
to require a balancing of the condemnor's and condemnee's uses, on the facts of each case. 
Thus, judicial balancing of uses appears to be a necessary concomitant of the standard of 
review preferred by this century-old treatise. See id. 
66 See Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 343, 348-51, 225 N.W. 164, 166-
67 (1929). 
66 See id.; see infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text; Weehawken, 20 N.J. at 577-78, 
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Courts traditionally have considered the determination of neces-
sity for taking property a policy-making function, reserved to a 
legislature. 67 When reviewing a taking of private property, a court 
will not question a legislatively authorized condemnor's determina-
tion of necessity for the taking. 68 In a contest between general 
condemnors, however, each party has a grant of legislative policy-
making authority.69 In such a case, traditional doctrine does not 
indicate a proper judicial role. 70 Courts sometimes have attempted 
to resolve the competing claims of general condemnors without as-
suming a legislative function by inferring legislative intent from 
implied-in-fact public necessity. 71 
Courts traditionally have deferred to legislative findings of fact, 
as well as to legislative policy-making prerogatives. 72 In a condem-
nation proceeding decided by a search for legislative intent to take 
public property, a court may permit a condemnor's factual allegations 
to go unchallenged. 73 If a court performs a balance of public uses, 
582-87, 120 A.2d at 595, 598-600. "[I]f the power to condemn a public use may be 'necessarily 
implied' from the statutory authority, it may be exercised." [d. at 580, 120 A.2d at 597. 
67 1A NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 4.11, at 4-174. 
68 See id. § 4.11, at 4-174, § 4.11[1], at 4-198. 
69 That is, both have grants of eminent domain, with the accompanying right to make 
independent determinations of necessity in selecting property to be taken. See id. 
70 In effect, a legislature, through its quasi-legislative delegate entities, is on both sides of 
the question. Even an executive agency or a public service corporation must perform a 
legislative function when it takes property because eminent domain authority lies only in 
legislatures. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 5 (1966). Thus, the conflicting decisions of 
general condemnors may be likened to a conflict in statutory provisions: a fit subject for 
judicial resolution. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 142 (1974) (duty of courts to construe laws); 
id. § 258 (duty of courts to resolve ambiguity so as to achieve most beneficial outcome). 
71 See Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 343, 348-52, 225 N.W. 164, 166-
67 (1929); cf infra notes 181, 197 and accompanying text. 
72 See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law'§ 340 (1979) (determination of facts is ancillary 
to legislative function, and may be delegated); see also id. § 327 (legislative recital of facts 
determined by investigation does not invade judicial function); id. § 315 (disposition of public 
lands is executive function, not subject to judicial review). In addition to a court's deference 
to a legislative finding, there is also the matter of deference to any official finding of fact, 
irrespective of what branch of government it originates from. Thus, courts grant a rebuttable 
presumption of correctness to facts found by lower courts or by court-appointed referees. 5 
AM. JUR. 2D Appeal and Error § 704 (1962). Courts also utilize a deferential standard in 
reviewing facts found by administrative agencies. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 618 
(1962). In takings of private property, courts withhold review of specific factual determinations 
such as the amount and location of property to be taken, in addition to the more general policy 
determination of whether any taking is necessary. 1A NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 4.11, at 4-
190, 4-192. 
73 For example, a court may accept a condemnor's finding that the condemnor can reasonably 
conduct its public duties only by taking the condemnee's property, and conclude that this 
implied-in-fact necessity arises from circumstances beyond the condemnor's control. See, e.g., 
City of Denver v. Board of Comm'rs, 113 Colo. 150, 162-64, 156 P.2d 101, 106 (1945) (deferring 
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however, the court must give equal weight to the factual allegations 
of the public entity in the role of condemnee. 74 If the parties' "facts" 
conflict, a court may abandon deference in favor of adjudicating the 
conflict. 75 
Judicial balancing of uses may thus be characterized by a probing 
analysis of both parties' facts.76 This probing factual analysis, and 
the even-handed treatment of both parties' necessity claims, signal 
that a court is effectively balancing public uses. 77 If a court phrases 
its opinion in terms of implied-in-fact necessity, then these signals 
may be the best means to discern the actual motivation behind a 
decision. 78 
C. A Comparison Between the Prior Public Use Rule and 
Judicial Balancing of Uses 
Some courts resolve property disputes arising between general 
condemnors by applying a mechanical rule, while other courts con-
to factual findings of home rule city taking for city's own use; judicial notice given to facts 
that might support condemnor city's necessity); State v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 235--36, 
239, 170 N.W.2d 95, 97, 99 (1969) (deferring to factual findings of agency taking on behalf of 
legislature). 
74 The condemnee's findings of fact are now before the court, as well as the condemnor's 
findings. Because both parties are supported by equal grants of legislative discretion, there 
is no reason for the court to favor one party's findings over the other party's. See Township 
of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 577-78, 582-87, 120 A.2d 593,595,580-600 (1956) 
(judicial balancing of uses without deference to either party's factual allegations). 
75 A court cannot simultaneously accept two conflicting statements of fact, so the court must 
abandon deference to at least one party's statement to try a case. A conflict between general 
condemnors presents a distinctly different problem, in this respect, than a taking of private 
property. If a condemnor takes private property, the necessity for the taking need not be 
reviewable, although due process entitles the owner to a trial of the "adjudicative" fact of the 
property's value. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.04 (1958). In a contest 
between two general condemnors, both the "legislative" issue of necessity and the supporting 
factual issues are in dispute, and there is no clear legislative intent to provide a resolution. 
Under these circumstances, a full trial of all pertinent factual issues appears to be the only 
rational means to determine which party actually possesses the greater necessity for the 
contested property. See infra notes 98, 192-94 and accompanying text. 
76 A court may be observed to conduct this factual analysis without deference to either 
party. See, e.g., infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text. 
77 Balancing is evident from these signals, if only because a court would have no reason to 
set out a condemnee's factual circumstances in its opinion if the. decision was based solely 
upon legal factors, or upon the condemnor's factual circumstances. Conversely, there is often 
little discussion of a condemnee's factual circumstances in cases where the condemnor takes 
on behalf of a sovereign. See, e.g., City of Denver v. Board of Comm'rs, 113 Colo. 150, 165-
69, 156 P.2d 101, 107-09 (1945); Hiland v. Ives, 154 Conn. 683, 684-85, 694, 228 A.2d 502, 
503,507 (1967); State v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 235--36, 170 N.W.2d 95,97 (1969). 
78 See infra notes 92-97, 109-15 and accompanying text. 
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duct a balancing of uses. 79 The Connecticut case of Canzonetti v. 
City of New Britain80 exemplifies mechanical application of the prior 
public use rule. 81 In Canzonetti, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
considered a city's attempt to condemn the property of a school 
board for a city road extension.82 The court determined that both 
parties held general grants of eminent domain from the state legis-
lature.83 There was nothing in the city charter authorizing condem-
nation of school property, either expressly or by necessary implica-
tion. 84 
The Canzonetti court decided for the condemnee school board, 
without considering what options were available to either party. 85 
Reasoning that the taking presented a non-justiciable policy issue,86 
the court held that the city had to obtain express legislative author-
ization to condemn school property. 87 
In contrast with Canzonetti, the Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. 
State88 decision reflects a judicial balancing of uses. 89 In Minnesota 
Power, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a utility's suit to 
condemn an easement through a state park to construct a power 
line. 90 The court concluded that neither the language in the utility's 
eminent domain statute nor its implication showed a legislative in-
tent to authorize condemnation of park property. 91 
The Minnesota Power court then turned to a balancing of uses, 
but characterized the analysis as a search for legislative intent im-
plied in fact.92 The court considered the cost and convenience benefits 
79 Compare infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text with infra notes 92-97 and accom-
panying text. 
80 147 Conn. 478, 162 A.2d 695 (1960). 
81Id. at 482, 162 A.2d at 696. 
82 Id. at 480, 162 A.2d at 696. The school board sued for a declaration that its property 
could not be taken by the city. The trial court certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court the 
question whether the city could take without school board consent. Id. at 479, 162 A.2d at 
695. 
83 See id. at 480-82, 162 A.2d at 696. 
84 Id. at 482, 162 A.2d at 696. 
85 Id. at 480, 482, 162 A.2d at 696-97. 
86 Id. at 482, 162 A.2d at 696. 
87 Id., 162 A.2d at 697. 
88 177 Minn. 343, 225 N. W. 164 (1929). 
89 Id. at 348-51,225 N.W. at 166-67. 
90 Id. at 343,225 N.W. at 164. 
91 Id. at 348-49,225 N.W. at 166. The court also concluded that the park was in actual prior 
public use, id. at 346,225 N.W. at 165; and that the utility's use was not consistent with the 
prior park use, id. at 350-51,225 N.W. at 167. 
92 The court indicated that its standard of evaluation was "the rule that a corporation has 
implied power to condemn [public property], because otherwise it could not reasonably carry 
on its business and exercise its franchise powers." Id. at 349,225 N.W. at 166. 
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that the utility would achieve from the taking. 93 The court also 
considered the aesthetic and ecological impacts on the park. 94 These 
impacts would include defoliation of the strip of land in question, 
erection of towers and support cables, and continuing intrusions for 
maintenance. 95 The court also considered the alternatives available 
to each party: the utility already possessed five easements through 
the park including one in the direction of the proposed taking, 96 
while the park faced a continuing series of encroachments that could 
result in final destruction of its public value.97 
Based upon its balance of uses, the court reversed a trial court 
finding that public necessity required the taking.98 The Minnesota 
Power court concluded that the facts did not support the utility's 
claim of necessarily implied authority.99 Thus, the court held for the 
condemnee park. 100 
The Township of Weehawken v. Erie RailroadlOl case demon-
strates a more overt use of judicial balancing than the Minnesota 
Power decision. l02 In Weehawken, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
partially overturned a town's taking of railroad company land to 
construct a recreation facility.l03 Like the Minnesota Power court, 
the Weehawken court characterized its analysis as a search for leg-
islative intent in the factual circumstances. 104 The Weehawken court, 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 350--51, 225 N.W. at 167. 
96 Id. at 350,225 N.W. at 167. 
96 Id. at 349,225 N.W. at 166. 
97 Id. at 351,225 N.W. at 167. 
98 Id. at 351--52,225 N.W. at 167. Minnesota Power thus represents a clear break with 
deference to the condemnor's finding of implied-in-fact necessity, as well as a reversal of the 
trial court's finding of necessity for the taking. 
99 Id. at 352, 225 N.W. at 167. The court also stated that necessarily implied authority 
("public necessity") would be required to support a taking, even if the utility'S use was held 
to be consistent with park use. This dictum was not material to the court's decision, however, 
as the court held that the utility's use was inconsistent with the prior use and unsupported 
by public necessity. Id. at 351--52,225 N.W. at 167. 
100 Id. 
101 20 N.J. 572, 120 A.2d 593 (1956). 
102Id. at 576-78, 582-87, 120 A.2d at 595, 597-600. 
103 Id. at 575, 586, 120 A.2d at 594, 600. Both the town and the railroad company were 
general condemnors. See id. at 578-79, 120 A.2d at 596. The court found at the outset that a 
portion of the contested property was in actual prior public use because the condemnee railroad 
had a bona fide intent to utilize it to construct a public facility. Id. at 581-83, 120 A.2d at 597-
98. The court further found that the condemnor township'S use was not consistent with the 
condemnee's use unless modified according to the partition of the property engineered by the 
court. See id. at 586, 120 A.2d at 600. 
104 Id. at 580, 120 A.2d at 597 (discussing "the range of factual circumstances upon which 
[eminent domain] may be 'necessarily implied"'). 
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however, admitted frankly that its analysis included a judicial bal-
ancing of the competing uses. 105 
The Weehawken court imposed a burden of proving "reasonable 
necessity" for the taking upon the condemnor town. 106 This reason-
able necessity standard could be met if a judicial balance showed 
that the public would be better served by a taking, or showed that 
the advantages to the condemnor outweighed the disadvantages to 
the public entity in the role of condemnee. 107 In applying its balance, 
the court considered equitable, as well as factual arguments, and 
weighed the alternatives available to each party. 108 
In presenting the arguments, the town of Weehawken claimed 
public necessity for its use because of a recent loss of town prop-
erty.109 The town also argued that only a small minority of the 
population could utilize a planned railroad facility, while a town 
facility would benefit the public at large. 110 A further factor was that 
another entity would fund the town's project, providing additional 
benefit to the town's population. 111 
The railroad argued that the contested site had great functional 
convenience for the planned railroad facility, and offered only neutral 
value for town purposes. 112 Further, a motor freight company essen-
tial to the railroad's plan preferred the contested site. 113 Only one 
other site of the type needed by the railroad was available, and that 
site was in another municipality.114 Although the property was not 
yet in public use, the railroad established that it had a bona fide 
intent to construct its own public facility as soon as the litigation 
was concluded. 115 
The railroad complemented its factual arguments with a number 
of equitable arguments. 116 One argument was that the railroad's 
106Id. (concluding that a "comparative evaluation" of the competing public uses is a fit 
subject for judicial review); see supra note 47. 
106 Weehawken, 20 N.J. at 580, 120 A.2d at 597. 
107 Id.; see supra note 64. 
108 Weehawken, 20 N.J. at 576-78, 582-87, 120 A.2d at 595,598-600. 
109 Id. at 577, 120 A.2d at 595. In addition to the town's need for a recreation facility, the 
town presented testimony that it required a parking area. The court considered the nature of 
each town use, insofar as it related to the suitability of the site, but did not further probe the 
town's allegation of necessity. Id. at 586, 120 A.2d at 600. 
no See id. at 582, 120 A.2d at 598. 
111 Id. at 577, 120 A.2d at 595. 
n2Id. at 584-85, 120 A.2d at 599. 
n3 Id. at 584, 120 A.2d at 599. 
n4Id. 
n5Id. at 583, 120 A.2d at 598. 
n6Id. at 577-78, 582-87, 120 A.2d at 595, 598-600; cf. infra note 190. 
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plans had begun before the town publicly announced its project, and 
the town had not been diligent in providing notification.117 Further, 
when notified, the railroad had made good-faith efforts toward an 
extrajudicial settlement. lIS The railroad's efforts had included an 
offer to grant a portion of the contested property for town use. 119 
Also, the railroad had demonstrated continuing good faith by renew-
ing its offer during litigation. 120 
The Weehawken court held that the facts did not support implying 
legislative intent that the town take the entire property sought. 121 
In reaching its finding, the court concentrated on the alternative 
actions available to each party.122 The court noted that the town had 
greater flexibility in choosing its site,123 and that the railroad would 
be placed at a competitive disadvantage if forced to abandon its 
terminal project. 124 The court ultimately wrought an accommodation 
between the parties, severing a portion of the contested property 
that the railroad admitted was not intended for public use. 125 The 
court employed an additional balance of uses to make its solution 
practical, permitting the town to take an easement of access to the 
parcel of property allocated to it. 126 
In Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Commission-
ers,127 an Ohio appellate court specifically rejected the paramount 
public use doctrine applied in Weehawken. 128 Interestingly, the Rich-
mond Heights court proceeded to perform a balance of uses, consid-
117 Weehawken, 20 N.J. at 577, 584, 120 A.2d at 595, 599. 
118 [d. at 585-86, 120 A.2d at 599-600. 
119 [d. 
120 [d. 
121 See id. The court thus reversed the finding below that the condemnee's property was 
not in actual public use. [d. at 578-79, 120 A.2d at 596; cf. supra note 98. 
122 Weehawken, 20 N.J. at 585, 120 A.2d at 599. 
123 [d. 
124 [d. at 584, 120 A.2d at 599. 
125 [d. at 585-87, 120 A.2d at 599-600. The court's result could be interpreted as an appli-
cation of the prior public use rule (to the property retained by the railroad), and the "no actual 
public use" or the "consistent use" exception to the portion severed for town use. See Village 
of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Comm'rs, 112 Ohio App. 272, 286-87, 166 N.E.2d 
143, 153-54 (1960) (Guernsey, J., dissenting). The court's attention to factual detail, to the 
parties' equities, and to the standard of reasonable necessity, however, all belie that inter-
pretation. See Weehawken, 20 N.J. at 576-78, 582-87, 120 A.2d at 595,597-600. 
126 This refinement of the court's decision to sever the parcel required the court to conduct 
a balancing test to determine whether the limited taking of the easement would create a 
benefit to the town outweighing the detriment to the railroad. The court concluded that the 
town's benefit predominated for the easement property. See Weehawken, 20 N.J. at 585-87, 
120 A.2d at 600. 
127 112 Ohio App. 272, 166 N.E.2d 143 (1960). 
128 [d. at 282, 166 N.E.2d at 151. . 
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ering factual and equitable arguments for both parties. 129 The court 
termed this analysis a "balance [of] relative conveniences of the 
parties. "130 The court indicated that it conducted its balance of uses 
only because the condemnee had sued in equity for an injunction 
against the taking. 13l 
In Richmond Heights, the court considered a county's taking of 
village property for an airport expansion. 132 The county argued that 
the taking was supported by a long-standing master plan. l33 Addi-
tionally, the county argued that the village had acquired the con-
tested property in bad faith, intending to block airport expansion. 134 
The village had purchased the property immediately prior to the 
county's planned acquisition, and had no funding to support its plan 
to construct a recreation center. 135 
The village argued that it did have funding for another part of its 
project, a planned town hall. 136 The village had negotiated for a long 
period to purchase the property.137 The village also argued that its 
property was most suitable and economical for the village's planned 
uses. 138 
The Richmond Heights court held that the condemnee village had 
shown a good-faith intention to construct a town hall but that the 
intention to construct a recreation center was not proven. 139 The 
court also held that other sites might be available for a recreation 
center, and that the major portion of the contested property was 
necessary for runway expansion. 140 The court's balance indicated that 
greater public benefit would result from use of this portion for a 
129 [d. at 276-79, 166 N.E.2d at 147-49. 
130 [d. at 283, 166 N.E.2d at 151. 
131 See id. at 282-83, 166 N.E.2d at 151. 
132 [d. at 273, 166 N.E.2d at 146. Both parties were general condemnors. The condemnee 
village had sued in equity to enjoin the condemnor county's taking. The condemnee appealed 
from a trial court ruling that enjoined only a part of the taking. [d., 166 N.E.2d at 145-46. 
133 [d. at 277, 166 N.E.2d at 148. The county also argued that it required the contested 
property to meet federal airport standards, and that the contested property was the only 
practical location for the county's proposed use. [d. at 276, 166 N.E.2d at 147. 
134 [d. at 275, 166 N.E.2d at 147. The county presented evidence that the village had 
purchased the property with full knowledge of the county's plans, and that the village had 
long opposed airport expansion. [d. at 276-79, 166 N.E.2d at 147-49. 
135 [d. at 277-79, 284, 166 N.E.2d at 148-49, 152. 
136 [d. at 276, 166 N.E.2d at 147. 
137 Financial constraints had delayed the village's actual purchase. [d. at 277-79, 166 N.E.2d 
at 148-49. 
138 [d. at 274-75, 166 N.E.2d at 146. 
139 [d. at 284, 166 N.E.2d at 152. 
140 [d. 
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runway than from its use as a recreation center.141 Accordingly, the 
court enjoined the county from taking the town hall property, but 
refused to enjoin the county from taking the portion intended for 
the recreation center. 142 
Thus, the Richmond Heights court conducted its analysis as an 
equitable balance of conveniences, while the Minnesota Power and 
Weehawken courts utilized the device of a search for implied-in-fact 
legislative intent. 143 All three decisions contain signals of judicial 
balancing, but the courts evidently were uncomfortable with a formal 
adoption of a balance of uses. 144 Judicial discomfort in the balancing 
role can be removed by legislative guidance in the form of statutes 
that invoke judicial balancing. 145 
D. Statutory Incorporation of Judicial Balancing of Uses 
California's statute on condemnation of public property, Article 7 
of Eminent Domain Law,146 codifies judicial balancing of uses under 
a system of stated priorities. 147 Although the statute does not ex-
pressly require judicial balancing, the statutory priorities are imple-
mented through a series of rebuttable presumptions. 148 That the 
presumptions are rebuttable suggests a legislative intent to make a 
court consider the uses of both a condemnor and a public entity in 
the role of condemnee. 149 Further evidence of legislative endorse-
141 Pursuant to its equitable role, the court phrased this balance negatively, in terms of 
minimal harm, rather than in terms of maximal benefit. See id. 
142 [d. 
143 See supra notes 92, 104, 130 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 93-99, 109-24, 133-38 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 77 and 
accompanying text. 
145 There is no constitutional impediment to a legislature delegating the balancing function 
to a court. See lA NICHOLS, supra note 4, § 4.11[4], at 4-262 to 4-263. 
146 Condemnation For More Necessary Public Use, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.610-
1240.700 (West 1982). 
147 [d.; cf. Dau, Problems in Condemnation of Property Devoted to Public Use, 44 TEX. L. 
REV. 1517, 1525-26 (1966) (comparing statutes of other states). But see Matteoni, The Cali-
fornia Roadway-"A More Necessary Public Use," 20 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 568-70 (1969) 
(arguing for reduced judicial role through stronger legislative guidelines). 
148 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.640, 1240.660, 1240.670, 1240.680 (West 1982). The statute 
also provides a procedural framework for litigation, id. §§ 1240.610-1240.630, 1240.690, 
1240.700, as well as an irrebuttable presumption in favor of use by a public entity as against 
use by a private entity. [d. § 1240.650. 
149 Further evidence of legislative intent to impose judicial balancing appears from the 
requirement that, once the condemnee's prior public use is established, the condemnor has 
the burden of proof that its use is more necessary than the condemnee's use. [d. §§ 1240.610, 
1240.620. It would be futile to impose such a burden of proof on a condemnor unless a court 
had discretion to decide whether, in fact, the condemnor's use was more necessary than the 
condemnee's use. 
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ment of balancing appears in language that makes a condemnor's 
burden of proving that it has a "more necessary public use" subject 
to some of the presumptions. 15o This language makes sense only if a 
court is to make a determination on the facts of whether a condemnor 
has proved that its use is more necessary than a condemnee's prior 
public use. 151 
If a condemnor meets its burden of proving that it has a more 
necessary public use, then Article 7 provides a specific grant of 
legislative authority to condemn public property. 152 Under the "more 
necessary public use" criterion, the burden is upon a condemnor to 
prove that its use is more necessary than a condemnee's,153 subject 
to the statutory presumptions. l54 For example, use by the state as 
against any other person,155 and prior use by a local public entity as 
against any other local public entity,156 are rebuttably presumed to 
be "more necessary uses."157 Thus, judicial balancing can tip in favor 
of condemning a local prior public use, or even condemning property 
of the state itself, if there is sufficient proof of a condemnor's more 
necessary public use. l58 Conversely, a condemnee may resist a tak-
ing, even one made on the state's behalf, if the balance shows that 
the condemnee's use serves a greater public necessity.159 
Article 7 indicates that two types of prior uses are presumed to 
be "the best and most necessary public use[s]."160 One such type of 
use is use by a nonprofit organization that has irrevocably dedicated 
150 [d. §§ 1240.640(c), 1240.660, 1240.670(b), 1240. 680(b). 
151 See id. 
152 [d. § 1240.610. 
153 This burden of proof falls upon the condemnor only after the condemnee has established 
its "actual" prior public use. [d. § 1240.620. The statute also incorporates a common-law 
exception to the prior public use rule, permitting condemnation of a portion of the property 
to enable two "consistent" public uses of the same property. See id. § 1240.630. The court is 
given discretion to set terms and engineer conditions to assure continuity of consistent uses 
without interference between them. [d. 
154 [d. §§ 1240.640, 1240.660, 1240.670, 1240.680. 
155 [d. § 1240.640. 
156 [d. § 1240.660. 
157 Use by a public entity is irrebuttably presumed to be more necessary than either the 
same or a different use by a private entity. [d. § 1240.650. This presumption accords with 
common-law doctrine that public ownership of facilities provides greater public benefit than 
does private ownership of the same facilities. City of Mesa v. Salt River Project Agric. 
Improvement and Power Dist., 92 Ariz. 91, 104, 373 P.2d 722, 731 (1962) (quoting City of 
Tucson v. Tucson Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 152 F.2d 552,555 (9th Cir. 1945)); State ex 
rei. Northwestern Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 28 Wash. 2d 476,484, 183 P.2d 802,807 (1947); 
City of Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 431--32, 107 P. 199, 203 (1910). 
158 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.640(b), 1240.660 (West 1982). 
159 See id. § 1240.640(a). 
160 [d. §§ 1240.670, 1240.680. 
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property to a nature preserve, open to public access. 161 The second 
type of best and most necessary use is for existing state, county, or 
city parks, and other enumerated public lands. 162 The presumption 
that these uses are best and most necessary affects a condemnor's 
burden of proof. l63 A condemnor must make an even stronger case 
to tip the judicial balance in favor of condemning one of the best and 
most necessary uses than to condemn one of the "more necessary" 
uses, by the state or by a prior-existing local public entity. 164 
Judicial balancing also is incorporated in Article 7 provisions for 
litigating conflicts between highway construction and existing parks 
or nature preserves. l65 For example, one clause indicates that de-
terminations of the State Transportation Commission are not con-
clusive evidence that a highway use will be consistent with a non-
profit nature preserve. 166 The statute thus relies upon judicial 
discretion to determine whether a highway taking of nature preserve 
property will be permitted. 167 
As with any statutory limitation upon sovereign power, the state 
can override Article 7 by enacting a new statute. l68 It is significant, 
161Id. § 1240.670(a). 
162 Id. § 1240. 680(a). Included are state and local parks and recreation areas, wildlife man-
agement areas, national historic sites and state-registered landmarks, and ecological reserves. 
Id. 
163 Id. §§ 1240.670(b), 1240.680(b). 
164 Compare id. §§ 1240.670(a), 1240.680(a) ("best and most necessary public use") with id. 
§§ 1240.640(a), 1240.660 ("more necessary [public] use"). 
165 Id. § 1240.690 (takings of private preserves or public parks for state highway construc-
tion); id. § 1240.700 (takings of public parks for local road construction). The fact that there 
is no provision for takings of private, nonprofit preserves for local road construction suggests 
that the legislature may have regarded such preserves as "more necessary" than local roads 
or public parks, and on a par with state highways. See id. § 1240.700(a). 
166 Id. § 1240.690(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989). 
167 See id. Such a degree of judicial discretion runs counter to common-law practice, which 
gives state agencies full legislative authority to take public property on a legislature's behalf. 
See Hiland v. Ives, 154 Conn. 683, 687-89, 228 A.2d 502, 504-05 (1967) (highway commissioner 
has discretion to take any property from general condemnor); State Highway Comm'n v. City 
of Elizabeth, 102 N.J. Eq. 221, 226-28, 140 A.2d 335, 337-38 (N.J. Ch. 1928) (highway 
commission can take any property of lesser entity); State v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 238-
39, 170 N.W.2d 95,98-100 (1969) (court will not review highway commissioner's discretion in 
determining necessity for taking; distinguishing Minnesota Power as contest between two 
general condemnors rather than between a state and a general condemnor). 
168 California does have other statutes setting priorities for certain specific public uses. See, 
e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 8134, 8560 (West 1970) (cemetery may not be taken 
for right of way); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5006.2 (West 1984) (particular state forest may 
only be taken by legislature; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 8030 (West 1977) (certain parcels at 
boundary of national reservation may not be taken); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21632 (West 
1965 & Supp. 1989) (local airport may not be condemned by department of transportation 
without consent). 
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however, that California has chosen to rely upon judicial balancing 
to determine most conflicts respecting use of its public lands. 169 
Under Article 7, even takings on the state's behalf may be subject 
to judicial review for public necessity. 170 This delegation of legislative 
authority bespeaks a high degree of confidence in judicial determi-
nation of the paramount public use. 171 
Judicial balancing of public uses has had some acceptance in both 
state common law and statutory law. Despite limited development 
of the doctrine and terminology, judicial balancing offers a rational 
mechanism for resolution of property use conflicts between general 
condemnors. Paradigms for judicial review illustrate the potential 
role of the paramount public use doctrine. 
III. PARADIGMS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PROPOSAL FOR 
ADOPTION OF PARAMOUNT PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE 
A. Paradigms for Judicial Review in Eminent Domain 
Proceedings Between General Condemnors 
The functions available to a court deciding a conflict of public uses 
may be clarified by the use of paradigms. Judicial roles span a 
continuum, from very deferential toward legislative intent,172 to very 
active in developing common law. 173 Three simplified examples from 
this continuum are considered. The three paradigms posit a conflict 
between two general condemnors, one of which has the contested 
property in public use and therefore acts in the role of condemnee. 174 
There is no statutory language establishing a hierarchy of public 
uses175 or directing which party is to utilize the contested property. 
In the first paradigm, the court is quite deferential to the legis-
lature, viewing the separation of powers as a strong bar to judicial 
169 See supra notes 149--51, 158--59 and accompanying text. 
170 See CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.620, 1240.640(a), 1240.640(c) (West 1982). 
171 See supra note 167. 
172 See Canzonetti v. City of New Britain, 147 Conn. 478, 482, 162 A.2d 695, 696 (1960); see 
supra text accompanying note 86. 
173 See Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 580, 120 A.2d 593, 597 (1956); 
see supra text accompanying note 105. 
174 It is given that courts already have made findings that the condemnee's property is in 
actual prior public use, although this finding is discussed further in connection with the first 
paradigm. It is also given that each court has made a finding that the condemnor's use is 
inconsistent with the use exercised by the condemnee. See supra note 36. 
175 See supra text accompanying note 147. 
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policymaking.176 The court examines the condemnor's legislative 
grant of eminent domain, determining whether authority to take the 
condemnee's property is expressed or necessarily implied in statu-
tory language. The court does not examine the condemnee's grant 
of eminent domain, because in retaining its property, the condemnee 
is not proceeding to exercise that power. If the condemnor has 
authority to take public property, then the court approves the con-
demnor's taking. 
If the statutory language contains no expression or necessary 
implication of legislative intent, then the court in the first paradigm 
is reluctant to find that the condemnor has authority implied in the 
facts. Implying authority from the condemnor's claim of necessity 
would involve the court in resolving the policy question of how strong 
the condemnor's need is. The court avoids the policy issue by finding 
for the condemnee, preserving the prior public use. The court gives 
consideration to neither the strength of the condemnee's necessity, 
nor the public value of the condemnee's use. 
In the second paradigm, the court is slightly more willing to 
confront policy issues. 177 If authority to take the condemnee's prop-
176 See City of Torrington v. Coles, 155 Conn. 199, 203, 230 A.2d 550, 551 (1967) (city 
redevelopment authority's taking of city park commission property barred by prior public use 
rule); Canzonetti, 147 Conn. at 481-82, 162 A.2d at 696 (city taking of school board property 
barred by prior public use rule); Vermont Hydro-Elec. Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 153, 112 
A. 223, 227 (1921) (city taking of hydroelectric corporation's water rights, held in reasonable 
anticipation of future needs that pertain to public franchise, barred by prior public use rule); 
see also Town of Brookline v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 357 Mass. 435,440-41,258 N.E.2d 
284,286-87 (1970) (city taking of town park property barred in absence of "explicit legislation" 
containing statement of the new use and a "recital showing . . . legislative awareness of the 
existing public use"); In re Wellington, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 87, 103, 105 (1834) (county com-
missioners' taking of town property barred by suspension of general powers if legislature has 
appropriated property to a specific use). 
177 See State ex rei. Northwestern Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 28 Wash. 2d 476, 486, 183 
P.2d 802, 808 (1947) (public utility district may take property of electric company to serve the 
same customers; court will not examine condemnor's determination of necessity absent alle-
gation of fraud or arbitrariness) (quoting State ex rei. Washington Water Power Co. v. 
Superior Court, 8 Wash. 2d 122, 132, 111 P.2d 577, 582 (1941»; see also Cuyahoga River 
Power Co. v. City of Akron, 210 F. 524, 527-29 (N.D. Ohio 1913) (city may take property of 
publicly franchised corporation under a "paramount right to appropriate property"; court will 
not question city's implied averment of necessity except for collusion or fraud), rev'd, 240 U. S. 
462 (1916); City of Mesa v. Salt River Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 92 Ariz. 91, 104, 
373 P.2d 722, 731 (1962) (city may take property of public power corporation for "more 
necessary" or "higher" public use) (quoting City of Tucson v. Tucson Gas, Elec. Light & 
Power Co., 152 F.2d 552,555 (9th Cir. 1945»; Austin Indep. School Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 
S. W.2d 878, 882 (Tex. 1973) (school district may take property of city; power might be implied 
from paramount importance of new enterprise and impracticality of accomplishing school 
purpose without the taking); Sabine & E. Texas Ry. v. Gulf & Interstate Ry., 92 Tex. 162, 
166, 168, 46 S. W. 784, 786-87 (1898) (railroad may take property of another railroad only if 
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erty is not expressed or necessarily implied in statutory language, 
the court considers the condemnor's proposed use. If the condemnor 
states that it will be unable to carry out its public duties without 
the property, then the condemnor meets the court's standard re-
quiring that its need for the public property must be "absolute. "178 
The court finds for the condemnor, inferring a legislative intent to 
condemn from the fact of the condemnor's absolute necessity. 
In the second paradigm, it appears as if the court is making a 
policy decision regarding the strength of the condemnor's necessity. 
The court accords great deference to the condemnor's own assess-
ment of necessity, however, because the condemnor is an agent of 
the legislature. The court performs no substantive analysis of the 
condemnor's necessity or available alternatives. 179 The court thus 
bases its holding for the condemnor upon the bravado of the condem-
nor's pleadings. As in the first paradigm, the court gives no consid-
eration to the necessity or public value of the condemnee's use. 
In the third paradigm, the court is even more willing to consider 
policy, if the legislature has not provided any guidance. 18o The court 
conducts an equitable balancing of the condemnor's and the condem-
nee's uses. 181 The court may apply a "reasonable necessity" standard, 
"the necessity be so great as to make the new enterprise of paramount importance to the 
public, and it cannot be practically accomplished in any other way"). 
178 The "absolute" necessity requirement may not be so difficult to meet as it sounds because 
the court defers to a condemnor's own assessment of its necessity. See infra note 179 and 
accompanying text. 
179 Compare Pennsylvania R.R.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. 150, 159 (1880) (necessity must be so 
absolute that condemnor's corporate purpose is defeated absent taking, and must arise from 
circumstances beyond condemnor's control) with State ex rel. Northwestern Elec. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 28 Wash. 2d 476, 485-86, 183 P.2d 802, 807-08 (1947) (city may condemn 
electrical facilities redundant to existing city facilities, and court will defer to city's determi-
nation of necessity for the taking). 
ISO See Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 343, 348-51, 225 N.W. 164, 166-
67 (1929) (public service corporation lacking statutory authorization may not take state park 
property if court's balance of uses shows that corporation can "otherwise reasonably carryon 
its business and exercise its franchise powers"); Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 
N.J. 572, 577, 580, 582-86, 120 A.2d 593, 595, 597-600 (1956) (city may take railroad property 
only if court's "comparative evaluation" of uses indicates that public interests will be better 
served, or advantage to condemnor will largely outweigh harm to condemnee); see also City 
of Buffalo v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 25,26-28,332 N.Y.S.2d 925,927-28 (Sup. Ct. 
1972) (city may not take property of gas corporation, found by court to serve "immediate and 
critical need" for gas testing, unless city provides replacement property acceptable to corpo-
ration). 
181 Balancing uses is an active judicial role that is legitimate only in the absence of legislative 
action. The balancing role is then proper, and it provides the most rational means to resolve 
the conflict between condemnor and condemnee. There is no need for the court in the third 
paradigm to appeal to "implied-in-fact" legislative intent to justify its action. Indeed, the court 
should not invoke that legal fiction. Appealing to implied-in-fact necessity merely obscures 
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requiring that the condemnor better serve the public interest than 
the condemnee, or that the condemnor's advantages from the taking 
largely exceed the harm to the condemnee. 182 
It appears as if the reasonable necessity standard is more favor-
able to the condemnor than the absolute necessity standard of the 
second paradigm. Unlike the court in the second paradigm, however, 
the court in the third paradigm does not permit the condemnor's 
allegations of necessity to go unchallenged. In addition to the con-
demnor's factual pleadings, the court in the third paradigm considers 
the condemnee's case. 
Because the condemnee has legislative authority equal to the con-
demnor's, the court in the third paradigm need not give greater 
deference to either party's claim of necessity. The court is free to 
weigh the facts of each party's use. The court probes each party's 
allegations in an adversarial proceeding, requesting additional infor-
mation or requiring the parties to make further study, as appropri-
ate. l83 If the parties do not represent all public interests, the court 
may accept amicus briefs that bear upon the necessity for the taking. 
The court in the third paradigm considers how essential the con-
tested property is, and what alternatives are available, to support 
each party's use. The court considers both economic and noneconomic 
factors. In the absence of any legislative guidance, the court also 
determines the relative public benefit to be derived from the two 
competing uses. Additionally, the court may address equitable fac-
tors, including a party's good-faith dealings and diligent efforts to 
reach accommodation. l84 The court considers statutory sources of 
general policy and common-law precedent, insofar as they apply to 
the facts. 185 The court finds for the condemnor or the condemnee, as 
the overall balance of facts and policy dictates. 
B. Proposal for General Adoption of Paramount Public Use 
Doctrine 
A court should adopt the paramount public use doctrine described 
in the third paradigm if no statute fairly can be read to resolve a 
the judicial balancing of public uses. See Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. State, 177 Minn. 
343,348,225 N.W. 164, 166 (1929); Weehawken, 20 N.J. at 580, 120 A.2d at 597; cf. infra 
note 186. 
182 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
183 That is, the court can request the parties to brief specific issues that the court finds 
inadequately addressed. See, e.g., J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 222-26 (1971). 
184 See infra note 190. 
186 The balancing test may be expedited, and its operation made more predictable, if the 
court articulates a series of standard factors to be considered. See infra note 191. 
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conflict between the two condemnors. 186 The central feature of the 
third paradigm is that the court considers both parties' uses. A court 
should follow Minnesota Power187 and Weehawkenl88 in even-handed 
treatment of general condemnors occupying both the condemnor and 
condemnee roles. A court should, however, dispense with the device 
of implied-in-fact necessity employed in those cases. 189 If judicial 
balancing is appropriate, then there is no need to mask it with a 
search for fictional legislative intent. 
A court applying the paramount public use doctrine should weigh 
each party's need for the contested property, as well as the public 
necessity for each use. A court should avoid undue deference to 
either party's claim of need, and should take a broad view of public 
necessity. The analysis of need should consider each party's alter-
natives to using the contested property, and any equitable factors 
supporting each party's use. 190 A court's analysis of public necessity 
186 This doctrine could be further expanded to encompass contests between a general con-
demnor and a private property owner who has irrevocably dedicated property to a valuable 
public use. The legal foundation for such expansion would be that the legislative intent 
embodied in the condemnor's actions was countered by a strong public policy favoring the 
condemnee's use. A court would require a clear legislative statement of that public policy to 
protect use by a private owner who did not possess eminent domain against taking by a 
general condemnor. California has provided such a policy statement in its eminent domain 
law. See CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 1240.670(a); see supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text. 
Courts have considered contests of the type described. See President and Fellows of Middle-
bury College v. Central Power Corp. of Vermont, 101 Vt. 325, 337~9, 342, 143 A. 384, 389 
(1928) (private preserve held in trust for public use cannot be taken by general condemnor). 
But see Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 267-68, 225 
A.2d 130, 134 (1966) (private preserve held open to public use can be taken by statutory 
authority of federally chartered utility corporation); Board of Educ. v. Pace College, 27 A.D.2d 
87, 89-91, 276 N. Y. S.2d 162, 164-66 (1966) (property of publicly supervised, nonprofit, private 
college can be taken by general condemnor). 
187 177 Minn. 343, 348-51, 225 N.W. 164, 166-67 (1929); see supra notes 93-99 and accom-
panying text. 
188 20 N.J. 572, 576-78, 582-87, 120 A.2d 593, 595, 597-600 (1956); see supra notes 109-24 
and accompanying text. 
189 See supra notes 92, 104 and accompanying text. 
190 Equitable factors could include each party's good faith and diligence in planning to avoid 
a pUblic-property taking; in publicly disclosing its plans to prevent others' detrimental reliance; 
in creating alternatives for its own use; in offering consistent uses; in creating alternatives 
for an opposing party; and in extra-judicial settlement negotiations. A court might also consider 
the extent to which each party has been affected by circumstances beyond its control. Addi-
tionally, a court might consider the success of each party's use of its other property that is 
not the subject of the contested proceeding. See, e.g., Village of Richmond Heights v. Board 
of County Comm'rs, 112 Ohio App. 272, 276-79, 166 N.E.2d 143, 147-49 (1960) (setting forth 
events evidencing each party's good faith and diligence in period preceding property use 
conflict). 
It may be questioned whether issues of equity should be considered in a contest between 
public entities. Public officials are presumed to act in good faith, for the public benefit. Thus, 
the public should be well served by whichever party prevails. It might be argued, however, 
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should encompass long-term public welfare and noneconomic factors 
implicated by each party's use. 191 Substantive consideration of both 
parties' uses underlies the principal arguments for the paramount 
public use doctrine. 
The primary argument for judicial balancing of uses is that it is 
the best way to decide conflicts between general condemnors. It is 
not practical for a legislature to resolve these conflicts individually. 192 
Any statutory attempt to provide a hierarchy of all public uses would 
be unwieldy, and would overlook factors unique to particular public 
entities and sites. In practice, condemnation proceedings are decided 
by courts, not by legislatures. The relevant choice is between judicial 
balancing of uses and judicial application of a more mechanical rule 
of decision. 
Under the first and second paradigms, a court does not consider 
the desirability of a prior public use. Neither the necessity of the 
site to the prior use, nor the public benefit derived from the prior 
use, is given weight in the court's analysis. The court in the first 
paradigm mechanically rules in favor of condemnees, under the prior 
that the party that behaves most equitably will provide the best stewardship of public 
property, and best serve the public interest. The use of equitable factors in a court's balancing 
analysis may be a carry-over from equity in private property disputes, or it may reflect a 
court's pragmatic view of the actions oflocal officials. In any event, some courts have employed 
equitable factors in balancing the necessities of competing public uses. See supra notes 116-
20 and accompanying text. 
191 A court might employ a "checklist" of pertinent factors to be applied flexibly to suit the 
circumstances of each case. This checklist should include both factual and policy factors. See, 
e.g., Comment, Balancing Public Purposes: A Neglected Problem in Condemnation, 35 ALB. 
L. REV. 769, 781 (1971). In addition to economic factors such as costs, relocation expenses, 
and economic benefits, factual considerations on a court's checklist might include the alter-
natives available to each party if it does not receive the contested property; the history of 
public access to an existing use; the history of each party's use of its other property; community 
acceptance and impacts of each use upon non-parties to the proceeding; whether a taking is 
part of an integrated plan or redevelopment effort; the existence of any unique cultural or 
historic value in a property; the existence of any endangered or nonrenewable resources on a 
property; and the possibility of consequential effects such as water pollution or devaluation of 
abutting property from a use. A court will take its policy guidance from constitutional and 
statutory enactments. If these enactments are not germane, a court's checklist of policy factors 
might include the protection of settled expectations and capital investment in an existing use; 
the promotion of integrated planning and juxtaposition of complementary uses; the preser-
vation of long-term uses; the promotion of parties' good-faith efforts to reach accommodation; 
and respect for the wishes of private citizens who dedicate property to public use; as well as 
the promotion of economic efficiency. It is not unrealistic to expect a court to include a large 
number of factual and policy considerations in its balance. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preser-
vation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 616, 618-19, 622-24 (2d Cir. 1965) 
(court considered a broad range of alternatives, noneconomic factors, and long-term factors 
in review of agency licensing of power plant), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
192 See Matteoni, supra note 147, at 570. 
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public use rule. The court in the second paradigm may operate nearly 
as mechanically, but with opposite results. 
Because the court in the second paradigm does not consider the 
condemnee's use, it may defer exclusively to the condemnor's asser-
tion of absolute necessity. Thus, the court in the second paradigm is 
likely to hold for the condemnor, under "implied-in-fact" legislative 
intent. Common sense suggests, however, that the best public use 
of a site does not depend upon whether the user happens to be a 
condemnor or a condemnee. 193 Under the third paradigm, then, a 
court allocates public property rationally, rather than relying solely 
upon the arbitrary procedural posture of the parties. 
The court in the third paradigm is more willing than the courts in 
the first and second paradigms to make effective use of its adjudi-
cative expertise. A rule that mechanically allocates property to one 
party or the other will choose a genuinely superior use in no more 
than half of the cases. A rational judicial decision, in contrast, may 
correctly choose the most necessary public use in a large fraction of 
the cases in which a legislature has provided no guidance to resolve. 
Because eminent domain proceedings must be decided by courts in 
all cases, the courts should reach decisions by a method that achieves 
correct results in the largest possible number of cases. 
The third paradigm utilizes a court's broad perspective, divorced 
from the political concerns of condemnors and condemnees. A court 
has no corporate stake in the outcome of a conflict over public prop-
erty use. A court can integrate the necessities of both parties into 
its analysis. If a court follows the second paradigm, however, these 
advantages are negated. By deferring to a condemnor's assertion of 
absolute necessity, a court substitutes the condemnor's judgment for 
its own. 
In contrast to a court, a condemnor may have a narrow conception 
of the public interest, reflecting only its own area of responsibility. 
A utility condemnor may be further limited by its primary respon-
sibility to shareholders. These considerations may particularly de-
tract from a condemnor's concern for long-term public benefits, and 
for the noneconomic values associated with some uses. A court's 
193 There is no more reason to prefer public uses on a "last in time, first in right" basis than 
to arbitrarily adopt the mechanical prior public use rule. Similarly, the resolution of the conflict 
cannot logically turn upon whether the condemnor first sued to condemn, or the condemnee 
first sued to enjoin condemnation. See Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 112 Ohio App. 272, 282-83, 166 N.E.2d 143, 151 (1960) (court applied judicial 
balancing of uses only because condemnee sued for injunction to block taking). 
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broad perspective is more likely to result in an impartial assessment 
of the necessity for a taking. 
The third paradigm also utilizes a court's effective fact-finding 
mechanisms. 194 An adversarial proceeding employs open discovery, 
expert testimony, and cross-examination to obtain full disclosure of 
the facts of a conflict. The additional investment in judicial resources 
to develop an accurate record of both parties' alternatives is re-
warded by a more beneficial allocation of valuable public property. 
The conclusory proceedings of the first and second paradigms rely 
largely upon one party's unchallenged statements of fact. The third 
paradigm thus is preferable for its more thorough testing of the facts 
of a case. 
More importantly, the third paradigm's balance enables a court to 
include the facts supporting both parties' cases in its deliberation. 
In particular, a court can explore the alternatives available to each 
party, should that party be barred from using the contested prop-
erty. Public benefit will be maximized if the party with the best 
available alternative is compelled to use that alternative. 
Beyond the selection of the paramount use for public property, 
judicial balancing of uses can have additional benefits. A court fol-
lowing the third paradigm has more authority over the parties than 
a court that, because it follows a mechanical rule, is effectively bound 
to reach a particular holding irrespective of the merits of the com-
peting uses. A court can use this authority to influence the parties 
to reach an accommodation. 195 Alternatively, a court may engineer 
an outcome different from that suggested by either party. As ex-
amples, a court may partition contested property,196 or may permit 
property to be taken subject to limitations upon the condemnor's 
use. Novel solutions, created by judicial authority, may result in 
greater public benefit than a summary holding for either the con-
demnor or condemnee. 
The judicial balancing role of the third paradigm may be criticized 
as intruding upon the legislative policy-making function. Under the 
third paradigm, however, judicial balancing is applied only if a leg-
islature has not acted. 197 The restriction upon judicial policymaking 
194 See J. SAX, supra note 183, at 218-25. 
195 See, e.g., id. at 222-26. 
196 See, e.g., Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 585-86,120 A.2d 593,600 
(1956); ct. Richmond Heights, 112 Ohio App. at 285, 166 N.E.2d at 152. 
197 A court will conduct a balance of public uses only if there is no legislative intent to permit 
a condemnor to take public property expressed, or necessarily implied, in the language of a 
statute. A legislature may include a provision enabling a general condemnor to take public 
property in the statute granting eminent domain or in a separate enactment. If there is no 
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is not one of kind but of degree. Courts continuously make policy 
decisions through statutory interpretation, through the resolution of 
conflicts of laws, and through extensions of common-law principles. 198 
Conflicts between general condemnors represent a class of cases 
from which legislative intent is often absent. Ifthel~ is no possibility 
of contradicting legislative intent, judicial policy determination is 
appropriate. 
The judicial balancing role of the third paradigm may also be 
criticized as judicial interference in a condemnor's area of expertise. 
A condemnor may have a high degree of technical knowledge about 
its own requirements. A condemnor may also have broad planning 
authority and responsibility to coordinate taking and development 
of property extending over a large region. A court, in contrast, may 
have little special knowledge of a condemnor's programs. 
These factors do not detract from a court's ability to decide prop-
erty-use conflicts, any more than they would disqualify a court from 
deciding other technical cases. 199 No matter how expert a condemnor 
is regarding its own needs, it may lack knowledge or objectivity in 
assessing the condemnee's requirements. A court can weigh the 
public necessities of both parties. Through the trial process, a court 
can acquire sufficient knowledge to make an informed decision. Leg-
islative recognition of judicial competence to evaluate takings made 
on the legislature's behalf2°o suggests that courts possess sufficient 
expertise to balance the uses of general condemnors. 
The balancing of uses is not a novel role for courts to assume. 
Courts of equity have long performed a similar function in deciding 
whether injunctions should be issued. 201 The "reasonable necessity" 
standard utilized in the third paradigm is similar to the standard 
such statutory provision, then it is a reasonable inference that the legislature has not consid-
ered the problem. Alternatively, the legislature has not established a sufficient consensus to 
enact such a provision. In either event, there is no legislative "intent" with regard to the 
taking of public property. Thus, there can be no judicial abrogation of legislative intent. See 
supra note 181. 
198 See, e.g., Norway Plains Co. v. Boston and Maine R.R., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263,267-68 
(1854) (cases for which there is no precedent can be decided under "considerations of reason, 
justice and policy, which underlie the particular rules of the common law"); cf Chayes, The 
Role o/the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302 (1976) (suggesting 
that federal district court may act in the role of "policy planner and manager," as well as 
legislator, when issuing a decree). 
199 See J. SAX, supra note 183, at 150; cf Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
541 F.2d 1, 35~6 (D.C. Cir.) (court reviewing agency action in technical case has duty to 
make "intensive" effort to understand the evidence) (dictum issued in context of arbitrariness 
review of informal rulemaking), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
200 See supra notes 159, 166-67 and accompanying text. 
201 See 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 56 (1969). 
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applied in granting injunctive relief. 202 Under the third paradigm, a 
court must weigh public harm and benefit, as it would in granting 
injunctive relief against a public nuisance. 203 Courts also have ex-
pertise in weighing public necessity in cases that involve fundamen-
tal rights. 204 Thu3, the judicial balancing of public uses is a role that 
courts are qualified to perform. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The paramount public use doctrine offers a rational method for 
deciding eminent domain proceedings between two entities with 
general condemnation power. A court identifies the paramount use 
through a judicial balancing of the competing uses. The balance 
weighs both parties' needs for the contested property. The court 
also considers the alternatives available to each party, and the public 
benefit produced by each use. 
Some courts have avoided judicial balancing of uses as an infringe-
ment on the legislative policy-making function. These courts have 
applied the prior public use rule, or, in some cases, have sought an 
implication of a condemnor's authority from necessity implied in fact. 
The prior public use rule arbitrarily allocates public property to a 
condemnee. The implied-in-fact necessity rule allocates property to 
a condemnor, if a court defers to its claim of necessity. Neither of 
these rules of judicial deference gives consideration to the substan-
tive arguments for both competing uses. 
Judicial balancing occurs only if it is clear that there is no appli-
cable legislative intent. Judicial balancing is a legitimate means to 
resolve a conflict over the use of a specific, publicly owned site. 
Balancing also utilizes a court's broad, disinterested perspective to 
enable more effective resolution of public use conflicts than is ob-
tained if a case is decided by a mechanical rule. 
In the absence of statutory guidance, courts should adopt judicial 
balancing to decide eminent domain proceedings between general 
condemnors. This adoption will help to ensure that public property 
is allocated according to a rational evaluation of its potential uses. 
The result will be effective judicial determination of the paramount 
public use. 
202 Compare id. with supra note 64. 
203 See 42 AM. JUR. 2n Injunctions § 59 (1969). Compare. supra note 107 and accompanying 
text with supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
204 See Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 181 Colo. 411, 418-20, 509 P.2d 1250, 
1253-54 (1973). 
